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Maritime Security in East Asia:  





The current maritime security environment of East Asia is a complicated mix of old and new 
challenges. The major issues include island and boundary disputes, naval arms build-up, protection of 
sea-lanes, navigational regimes and activities in the exclusive economic zone, competition over 
resources, and maintenance of law and order at sea. These issues, unless dealt with adequately, could 
pose serious threats to regional stability. The most urgent task for the region in responding to these 
challenges is the building of a stable and secure maritime regime as well as the implementation of 
maritime confidence-building measures. 
 





It is well known that the East Asian region is a community of maritime nations.  There 
are few East Asian states that do not have significant maritime frontiers and strong maritime 
interests. The commercial and strategic significance of the sea in the region requires little 
elaboration. The sea is a major source of food for the region, and the sea lanes are the life-
lines of the East Asian economies, heavily dependent on unimpeded access to raw materials, 
markets and investment opportunities throughout the region. The region also encompasses a 
number of strategic straits, some of which lie across the vital oil supply routes that stretch all 
the way from the Persian Gulf. 
This strong maritime orientation dictates the security, political as well as economic 
outlooks of all states in the region. Any analysis of the geopolitics of the region must account 
for this maritime character which for long time has been taken for granted. As the economies 
of the region have developed and extra-regional influences have declined, so have 
governments turned their attention more closely to the security of their own maritime 
interests. As a result, maritime issues are at the forefront of current regional security 
concerns. Of the thirty or so conflict points in the region, more than a third involve disputes 
over islands, continental shelf claims, EEZ boundaries and other offshore issues. Many 
emerging regional security concerns, such as piracy, terrorism, pollution from oil spills, 
safety of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), illegal fishing and exploitation of other 
offshore resources, and other important elements of economic activities are essentially 
maritime. Theses concerns, in fact, are reflected in the significant maritime dimension of the 
current arms acquisition programs in the region. Unfortunately, some of these new 
capabilities tend to be more offensive, inflammatory and, in conflict situations, potentially 
prone to the possibilities of inadvertent escalation. For this reason, maritime concerns is well 
reflected in current proposals for regional confidence and security building measures 
(CSBMs), where about a third of the proposals are intended to directly address maritime 
matters, while others have significant maritime dimension. It is therefore important that 
regional mechanisms be instituted to address these maritime issues ― both to address the 
cause of tension and to manage and reduce such tension. 
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This paper examines maritime issues which could pose serious threats to maritime 
security in the East Asian region, and then explores the appropriate measures necessary to 
enhance regional maritime security. Particular attention will be paid to the relevance and the 
role of legal rules in improving maritime security environment, as East Asia is characterized 
by a number of features which give prominence to certain law of the sea issues. 
 
 
2. MAJOR MARITIME SECURITY ISSUES IN EAST ASIA 
 
While there are a myriad of maritime issues in East Asia, major issues in the region can 
conveniently be divided into the following categories: disputes about the sovereignty of 
offshore islands; issues of maritime boundaries; naval arms build-up and its implication on 
the security of sea-lanes; navigational regimes; resource conflicts; and the maintenance of 
law and order at sea. The followings are a brief analysis of the issues that can pose a threat to 
stable maritime environment in the East Asian region. 
 
2.1. Territorial Disputes 
 
The most well-known island dispute in East Asia is the Spratly in the South China Sea.  
Within the South China Sea, the Paracel Islands and Macclesfield Bank have also been 
source of dispute, but the Spratly Island is contested by six different claimants and have 
drawn the greatest attention.
1
 The question of who owns the 400-plus rocks, reefs, and 
islands within the South China Sea was largely ignored until 1970s.  By the 1970s however, 
the area had become a possible target for exploration by multinational oil companies. 
Motivated by the desire to extend control over sea-based resources, neighboring states in the 
area have increasingly come into verbal conflict and even sporadic military confrontation 
over sovereignty in the South China Sea. During the 1980s and 1990s, most states found 
themselves in a race to bolster their claims to sovereignty by gaining occupation of the 
islands that can support a physical presence. Currently, Vietnam occupies over twenty islets 
or rocks, China occupies eight, Taiwan one, the Philippines eight, Malaysia three to six. The 
race for occupation of the Spratly has increased the likelihood of conflict, resulting in three 
cases of military intimidation in recent years, one of which led to military conflict. The 
Spratly dispute thus remains one of the most dangerous spot in the region. While all the 
claimants have endorsed the use of peaceful means to overcome their differences, it is 
worrying that all claimants, except Brunei, have stationed troops in the Spratlys. With time 
most of the claimants will be in a good position to project military power into the South 
China Sea. Progress in the informal South China Sea workshops hosted by Indonesia has 
been slow because of the difference in the approaches, priorities and agendas of China and 
the South China Sea states, but some cooperation has been achieved in non-contentious areas 
such as the conduct of marine scientific research, the preservation of the ecosystem and 
pollution control (Townsend-Gault, 1998: 21-35). 
There are three major island disputes in the seas of Northeast Asia: namely the dispute 
over the Senkaku Islands
2
 (or Tiao-yu-t’ais) between Japan and China; the dispute over the 
Dokdo (or Takeshima) between Korea and Japan; and the dispute over the Northern 
Territories (or Southern Kuriles) between Russia and Japan. Like the Spratly in the South 
China Sea, the three island disputes in Northeast Asia, unless carefully dealt with, could also 
                                                          
1 For a detailed study of the Spratly dispute, see for example Valencia and Dyke (1996: 223-262). 
2 For an update of the dispute, see Su (2004: 45-61).  




erupt to major threats to regional security anytime. While the island disputes in Northeast 
Asia raised tension between rival claimants from time to time over the past decades, its 
importance has considerably increased in recent times for two reasons. First, the resurgence 
of the territorial disputes has much to do with the regional states’ moves to extend their 
maritime jurisdictions by establishing the 200-mile exclusive economic zones, which was in 
turn motivated by growing concern for resource development and environmental protection.
3
 
One of the consequences arising from such extended maritime jurisdiction is the overlapping 
of competing jurisdictions, and, thus, the necessity of delimitation. In Northeast Asia where 
the distance between the coastal states does not exceed 400 miles, the question of boundary 
delimitation inevitably arises. Moreover, the extension of maritime jurisdiction also 
exacerbates the decade-long island disputes in the region, as the boundaries may not be 
delimited unless the sovereignty disputes over the islands are resolved in one way or another.  
Second, the disputes are deeply affected by historic grievance and identity politics, which 
unfortunately seem to rising in the region. Paradoxically, the end of the Cold War and 
democratization in the region has made sovereignty issues more, not less, difficult to resolve.  
Conservative politics in Japan and a rising nationalistic tide in China and South Korea have 
further complicated the whole situation. Sometimes sovereignty disputes are exploited to 
further political ends.   
The intensity of these territorial disputes cannot thus be explained entirely in terms of the 
economic or strategic value of the islands in dispute. The risk of a military conflict over any 
of the disputed islands, however, seems unlikely. The political and human costs would be 
huge, while the economic and security benefits would be relatively small. But there is a risk 
that agitators on either side may precipitate a crisis by undertaking provocative acts, which 




2.2. Boundary Disputes 
 
In the Northeast Asian region, there are currently three maritime boundary agreements in 
force.
5
 The geographic circumstances of the area require the conclusion of a few more 
bilateral and trilateral agreements to complete maritime boundaries in this area. Yet two 
factors make the boundary delimitation in this area particularly thorny. First, it has been 
pointed out that there exist some very difficult territorial disputes in the region. Unless these 
territorial disputes are resolved, which is highly unlikely, it may not be possible to delimit 
the boundaries. Second, as the continental shelf dispute in the early 1970s showed, coastal 
states appear to be in serious disagreement as to which laws should apply to boundary 
delimitation in the region. Moreover, the complicated geography of the region and the 
uncertain nature of the seabed make delimitation an extremely difficult issue. The current 
dispute between China and Japan over natural gas exploration and drilling in the East China 
Sea is directly related to the delimitation of continental shelf between the two countries in 
that area (Curtin, 2005). 
In the Southeast Asian region, on the other hand, there are currently over 20 maritime 
                                                          
3 For more on the recent developments, see Mack (1997); Paik (1997: 319-334). 
4 This is exactly what has happened in Northeast Asia recently. See Epinions.com (04/22/2005). 
5 The first boundary in the region was delimited between South Korea and Japan in the continental 
shelf area through the Korea Strait north of Tsushima Island in 1974. In 1986 and 1990 respectively, 
North Korea and the Soviet Union (now Russia) agreed on their territorial sea boundary and 
continental shelf and EEZ boundaries in the northern East Sea (or Sea of Japan). 
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boundary agreements in force.
6
 However, given the greater number of coastal states and the 
complicated geographical nature of the region, there still remain a number of important 
boundaries to be delimited. In fact, the geographical circumstances relating to the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Southeast Asia sub-region are far more 
complicated than those found in the Northeast Asia sub-region. Moreover, this area also has 
a series of highly complicated territorial disputes involving the ownership of uninhabited 
islands and coral outcroppings, most of them in the South China Sea. 
The absence of agreed boundary and resulting unilateral claims could be a source of 
uncertainty and conflict among the states concerned. Moreover, overlapping national 
maritime jurisdictions could pose significant problems for marine environmental 
management and marine resource development in the region. 
 
2.3. Naval Arms Build-Up and SLOC Security 
 
The East Asian region as a whole enjoyed the highest rate of economic growth in the 
world in the 1980s and 1990s. While the financial crisis of the late 1990s dealt a blow to the 
region’s economic prosperity for some time, the regional economy is more dependent on 
trade, especially exports than ever before. For example, exports now account for an average 
of 64% of East Asia’s GDP, up from 55% in the early 1990s (Economist 7/12-18/2003: 11-
12). The medium of such expanded trade is shipping, which carries over ninety-eight percent 
of all goods traded. Except for high value cargoes carried by air, all intra-regional trade in 
fact goes by sea, and many regional nations lack self-sufficiency in energy, foodstuffs, and 
critical raw materials. Thus the increased importance of the East Asian trade means a 
remarkable growth in sea-borne trade that traverses the Pacific Ocean.
7
 Against this 
backdrop, the security of merchant shipping in the region is the subject that certainly 
deserves continued attention. 
It is generally acknowledged that with the end of the Cold War, overall strategic 
environment has improved in the Asia-Pacific region and the consequent threat to the 
security of sea lanes is rather remote. However, this does not necessarily mean that threats to 
the security of the sea lanes have ceased to exit in the region. In fact, while the end of the 
Cold War has certainly resulted in the decline of the activities of major naval powers in the 
region, the United States and Russia, it has also led to the rather paradoxical situation where 
more navies of regional powers have begun to assert themselves in regional waters, 
apparently to fill the power vacuum. For instance, China’s naval capability has expanded 
over the years from a coastal defense role to an ability to project power further offshore 
(Kaneda 2005).
8
 Such capability has assumed greater significance in the South China Sea, 
where territorial disputes remain unresolved. It is known that Japan has the capability in 
technology and financial resources to go beyond the manifest task of protecting waters 
within 1,000 nautical miles from its mainland. A long-range sea lane defense strategy is in 
prospect, indicated by the procurement policy of Japanese defense agency.
9
 In addition, other 
countries in the region, including Taiwan, South Korea and most ASEAN countries, are 
                                                          
6 For details of maritime boundary agreements in force in the East Asian region, see Charney and 
Alexander (1993). 
7 For shipping in the Asia-Pacific region, see Forbes (2003). 
8 For a detailed study of China’s naval transformation, see Jin (2005). 
9 For a detailed study of Japan’s naval strategy, see Takai (2005). 




acquiring more powerful naval forces and developing their maritime capabilities. The cause 
of such naval arms build-ups in the region today stem from growing concern with strategic 
uncertainty and differing national interests, that is, the urge to protect and expand a sphere of 
influence and the fear of losing it. The states concerned thus pay heed to the geo-strategic 
dimension of their rivalries. The result is that despite reduction in the US and Russian 
maritime presence, the maritime security environment in East Asia is becoming more 
complicated. Consequentially, there will be more navies, and an increased risk of incidents 
between maritime forces, thus resulting in a potentially unstable maritime environment. Of 
particular concern is disruption of SLOCs by conflicts involving actions by China or others 
to enforce claims to Taiwan or the Spratly Islands, or to oil fields in dispute with Vietnam.  
 
2.4. Navigational Regime and SLOC Security 
 
The other issue related the SLOC security is navigational regime, as the security of 
shipping is difficult to expect in the absence of clear common rules on navigation. Three 
specific categories of navigational controls ― innocent passage, transit passage and 
archipelagic sea lanes passage ― are designed in the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (LOS Convention) to balance the rights of user or maritime states with the 
interests of coastal states. Some coastal nations tend to interpret the navigation regimes 
differently from the maritime powers. The former are generally interested in imposing 
controls in waters under their jurisdiction for purposes of national security and 
environmental protection. The latter tend to interpret the rules to permit a maximum degree 
of navigational freedom. The most important unresolved issues in the Convention, which 
could affect the security of the SLOCs in the Asia-Pacific region, are as follows. 
First, it is beyond dispute that a foreign vessel enjoys the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea of the coastal state.
10
 However, it has long been controversial 
whether the right of innocent passage applies to all ships, including warships or ships 
carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances. In particular, the right 
of innocent passage for warships has been a much debated issue in the international 
community, and many coastal states have been reluctant to permit passage without prior 
authorization or at least notification. Further, general state practice remains conflicting. The 
history of foreign invasion and traditionally sensitive security concerns in East Asia caused 
many coastal states in the region to have strong reservations on the right of foreign warships 
to innocent passage through their coastal waters.
11
 Despite the adoption of the Convention, 
this issue remains unresolved, and has become a potential source of conflict. 
Secondly, under the Convention, straits used for international navigation are subject to 
the new regime of transit passage.
12
 The transit passage is defined as the exercise of freedom 
of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit in 
the normal modes of operation. It is generally understood that submarines are free to transit 
international straits submerged, since that is their normal mode of operation. As far as 
passage in the international straits is concerned, controversy appears to lie not in its military 
                                                          
10 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Section 3. 
11 The following states in the East Asian region require either authorization or notification for the 
innocent passage of foreign warships: Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, India, Indonesia, Republic of 
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Pakistan. 
12 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea., Part III. 
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aspect but rather in its commercial aspect. For example, a question frequently concerns the 
rights of a strait state to interfere with transit passage because of suspected pollution 
incidents, and the scope of corresponding enforcement measures that can be taken by a strait 
state.
13
 The strait states’ regulatory response to accidents and pollution that heavy use of the 
straits has caused could be a serious source of conflict in the region, where there are some 20 
important international straits.   
Thirdly, under the LOS Convention, an archipelagic state may designate sea lanes and air 
routes suitable for the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft 
through or above its archipelagic waters.
14
 Such archipelagic sea lanes must include all 
normal passage routes and all normal navigational channels. There are two important 
archipelagic states in the region, Indonesia and the Philippines. The Convention assigns these 
states for designating sea lanes in coordination with the competent international organization, 
that is, the International Maritime Organization (IMO). However, much uncertainty remains 
on the balance between maritime states and archipelagic states. Specifically, the respective 
roles and power of the IMO and of archipelagic states in designating sea lanes are subject to 
various interpretations. Given that designation of archipelagic sea lanes is a potentially 
potent device for regulating navigation, a source of conflict is not difficult to see unless 
common interpretation of an archipelagic regime is agreed (Batongbacal, 2003: 99-112).  
The other challenges to the free passage of ships through SLOCs in the post-Cold War 
East Asia encompass obstruction due to maritime accidents or disasters, damage by piracy, 
unilateral declarations restricting the use of specific waters, and intentional obstruction of 
shipping by, for example, mining of critical SLOC.
15
 In particular, the increased carriage of 
hazardous or dangerous cargoes poses a higher risk of damage or pollution as a result of 
collision, explosion, fire, grounding or other accident involving ships carrying dangerous 
cargoes. There are also concerns raised in relation to the lack of notification to coastal states 
of the routes the shipments take, to legal issues relating to the shipment of nuclear materials 
through sensitive ocean areas and to the liability of the states involved in the shipments 
should there be an accident.
16
 In the case of nuclear materials, the declarations of nuclear-
free zones may also raise difficult issues through inconsistency with the commitments made 
under the LOS Convention. While SLOC protection lends itself to cooperative regimes, 
some balance is needed between the concerns of maritime nations to keep the sea lanes open 
and as unregulated as possible and those nations whose coastlines lie about the strategically 
important sea-lanes and whose main concerns are associated with marine safety and traffic 
management issues.  
 
2.5. Resource Conflict 
 
Competition for scarce marine resources is another source of conflict in the region. It has 
been mentioned that the territorial and boundary issues are being made acute mostly because 
of the resources involved. In particular, fish which used to be found in abundance in the 
region have become very scarce due mainly to overfishing. Many national fishing grounds 
                                                          
13 For details, see Hamzah and Basiron (1996). 
14 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 53 
15 For details, see Kenny (1996). 
16 For the analysis of the difficult questions raised by the transport of radioactive wastes from Europe to 
Japan through the Asia-Pacific region, see Hewison (1998: 93-102). 




like the Yellow/East China Sea and the Gulf of Siam has long been depleted of fish. This 
situation has made fishery issue one of the most contentious maritime issues in the region. 
Currently, fishing regime in the Northeast Asia that has been in force over the past four 
decades is going through fundamental transformation as regional countries have established 
the 200-mile EEZs. New bilateral fishery agreements based on the regime of the EEZ have 
replaced the old treaties that had regulated the fishery relation among the regional 
countries.
17
 Although it may be an inevitable transition to the era of the EEZ, a path to the 
new era is riddled with many thorny issues, some of which already led to an acute diplomatic 
row between the countries concerned.
18
   
In Southeast Asia, illegal fishing has become a cause of tension among regional states.
19
 
Especially beginning from the late 1980s when the Cold War confrontation came to an end, 
Southeast Asian countries began to vigorously patrol their territorial seas and enforce 
demarcations. In addition, the complex geography of the region and changed maritime law, 
which introduced a 200-mile EEZ, meant that trawlers of some countries often had to intrude 
into the territorial waters of neighboring countries to reach their fishing locations. As a 
result, large numbers of trawlers of some countries, especially Thailand, were detained by 
neighboring countries such as Malaysia ad Myanmar. The frequency of the detentions and 
the resulting tensions clearly identified illegal fishing as a security threat. The situation has 
been made all the more serious, as regional countries has been increasing their naval 
capabilities either to enforce their laws or to prevent their fisherman from being arrested in 
neighboring waters. Perhaps it may be necessary to introduce incidents-at-sea agreements to 
prevent the escalation of low level conflicts in the near future. Such agreements are designed 
to prohibit or contain the consequences of inherently dangerous or inadvertent military 
activities through articulating codes of conduct for military forces and mandating crisis 
consultation and communication (Weeks, 1996: 79-94).  
 
2.6. Activities in the EEZ 
 
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), like other institutions of the law of the sea, 
attempts to accommodate two competing interests, that is the desire of coastal states for 
greater control over offshore resources on the one hand, and the perceived need of maritime 
powers to maintain traditional freedom of action in waters beyond the territorial sea, on the 
other. However, a delicately balanced construct of the LOS Convention
20
 remains subject to 
on-going controversy over its interpretation. Difference of views has emerged in East Asia 
over the rights and duties of coastal States in their EEZs vis-à-vis those of other States. One 
of them is the freedom of action of foreign navies within the EEZ of a coastal State; that is, 
whether a foreign navy is free to conduct military maneuvers with the EEZ without 
providing notice to, or obtaining authorization from, the coastal State; and whether a State 
may place military devices, such as submarine detection devices, in the EEZ of a foreign 
                                                          
17 For example, the new Korea-Japan fishery agreement, which entered into force in January 1999, has 
replaced the bilateral agreement of 1965. The new treaty has been strongly opposed by fishermen in 
both countries.   
18 For a discussion of the dangers related to the transition to the EEZ in Northeast Asia, see Paik (1996: 
171-184). 
19 For details, Ganesan (2002). 
20 United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part V. 




 The provisions of the LOS Convention are silent on these issues, although various 
interpretations have been forward to one effect or the other. As most of the waters of concern 
for maritime security in East Asia are within EEZs, ambiguity on such a sensitive matter 
would be a potential source of conflict because the restrictive regime of the EEZ would pose 
threat to the mobility of navies in peacetime.
22
  In fact, there has been a series of incidents 




2.7. Challenging Law and Order at Sea 
 
Piracy in a number of areas of the world has become an issue of international importance 
and concern.  In terms of the statistics, the threat posed by piracy in East Asian waters has 
exhibited a marked rise since the end of the Cold War. Now the piracy incidents in both 
Northeast and Southeast Asia amount to more than a half of the world total. Southeast Asia is 
by far the most piracy-prone region of the world.
24
 The lethality of piracy attacks also 
appears to be on the increase. Piracy thus constitutes a direct threat to the lives and welfare 
of the citizens of a variety of flag states. Particular concern has been expressed about the 
navigational hazards to ships often carrying dangerous cargoes, and the potential danger to 
navigation and the marine environment these ships may pose if left unattended, while 
streaming at full speed and under attack by pirates in confined waters.   
Terrorism is a growing global problem, especially since September 11. Terrorist threats 
evolving from the sea, such as sudden attacks conducted by terrorists against vessels or 
maritime facilities, are new and predicting them can be extremely difficult.
25
 A worst case 
scenario for a terrorist attack on shipping in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore would 
involve the hijacking of a tanker or chemical carrier with a large inflammable or explosive 
cargo. The hijacked vessel might then be used to attack a major port facility, especially one 
of the hub ports in the region (Richardson 2004). A completely new threat could also emerge 
from radio frequency weapons which can enable terrorists to attack targets at sea, resulting in 
lethal damage to electronic systems. The related issue includes the maritime transportation 
                                                          
21 Article 60 of the LOS Convention grants a coastal State exclusive control over all installations and 
structures that have either an economic function or which may interfere with the rights of coastal 
States in the EEZ. But the Convention is silent on the non-economic installations that do not interfere 
with coastal enjoyment of its EEZ rights. For more details, see Boczek (1988: 445). 
22 No State in East Asia has yet officialy required prior consent or notice for naval activities in their 
EEZs. On the other hand, Brazil, Cape Verde, Uruguay and some other States have announced that 
they would require prior consent.   
23 Major incidents include the March 2001 confrontation between the US navy survey vessel Bowditch 
and a Chinese frigate in China’s EEZ; the April 2001 collision between a US EP3 surveillance plane 
and a Chinese jet fighter over China’s EEZ; the December 2001 Japanese coast guard’s pursuit of and 
firing at a North Korean spy vessel in its and China’s EEZ; and Vietnam’s protest against Chinese live 
fire exercises in Vietnam’s claimed EEZ. 
24 According to the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center (PRC), in the eight years 
from 1995 to 2002, a total of 905 piracy incidents took place in Malaysian waters, Indonesia, the 
Malacca Straits, the Singapore Strait and the South China Sea.  These incidents ranged from attempted 
boardings, petty thefts to outright hijacking of ships. 
25 See “Piracy and Maritime Terror in Southeast Asia”, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 10, Issue 6, July 
2004. 




and smuggling weapons of mass destruction and related materials. Given the extreme 
difficulty of detecting and identifying such risky situations, the appropriate response may 
require more intrusive measures such as inspection and interdiction.
26
 However, the legality 
of those measures is often quite controversial.  
The fight against the international drug trade now has substantial international maritime 
dimensions, as has the problem of the passage of illegal migrant peoples. Insurance frauds 
involving both ships and cargoes are another continuing source of major concern in the 
growing field of international crime. It has been estimated that maritime fraud costs the 
international community more than 13 billion pounds annually. There is particular concern in 
the Asia-Pacific regarding cargo deviations, that is vessels not arriving at their nominated 
destination, but unloading the cargo elsewhere where it is sold and the vessel scuttled or re-
registered, and phantom ships, namely vessels with false identities.    
 
 
3. HOW TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY IN EAST ASIA 
 
The above analysis of existing and emerging threats to maritime security in East Asian 
region indicates that while traditional military threat has declined, a host of new non-
traditional security issues are on the rise. It should be noted, in particular, that many of those 
issues are directly or indirectly related with the growing uncertainties coming from the 
fundamental transformation of the existing political, strategic and legal order of the region.  
The above analysis also shows the extent to which regional security is compromised by the 
lack of agreed maritime jurisdiction and regime over important regional seas. This has 
contributed to a situation where there exist uncontrolled pollution, unregulated over-fishing, 
growing illegal activities at sea and excessive claims often leading to serious disputes. These 
problems will continue with consequent risks to regional security unless regional countries 
can respond to them effectively. What should be the response of the region to enhance 
maritime security in East Asia? 
 
3.1. Building of a Stable Regional Maritime Regime 
 
The most urgent task for the regional states and maritime powers with interests in the 
post-Cold War East Asian region is building a stable and secure maritime regime.
27
 Such a 
maritime regime is a fundamental requisite not only for enhancing security at sea but also for 
further maritime cooperation among the states in the region. Perhaps the first and best step is 
agreement on a common point of reference to guide the use and protection of the ocean. In 
this regard, it should be noted that the global ocean regime, in terms of authoritative norms 
                                                          
26 Fifteen states, including United States, United Kingdom, France and Japan, are currently discussing 
how to cooperate among themselves to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
related materials at sea, air and land under the “Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).”  
27 Regime can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations 
(Krasner 1995: 2). Thus a maritime regime includes formal or informal principles, rules, norms, and 
practice related to the use and protection of ocean. The most important, though not the only, 
component of maritime region is the LOS Convention, to which most countries in East Asia are 
parties. 
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for the jurisdiction and use of the ocean, received its most complete expression in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. As such the LOS Convention may serve as a 
good basis for building a stable maritime regime in the region.
28
 While the LOS Convention 
obviously does not resolve all the outstanding maritime issues, it will surely play a long-term 
stabilizing role by clarifying and refining the rules applicable to ocean affairs and preventing 
the growth of state practice which is at variance with established universal norms. 
However, despite the seemingly strong support for the LOS Convention in the region, 
there are considerable doubts concerning the precise rules for governing the use of the ocean 
since many provisions lack clarity and are subject to different interpretation. In this sense, a 
stable maritime regime for East Asia like elsewhere requires agreement on how to apply the 
terms of the LOS Convention. In fact, the necessity to develop a uniform, coherent maritime 
regime through commonly acceptable interpretation is more acute in this part of the world 
than any other regions, mainly because practice on the important aspects the ocean uses 
substantially diverges among the coastal states in the region. In this respect, the following 
points deserve mentioning.  
First, it is important to enhance the openness and transparency about maritime regime and 
practice of regional states. In fact, the LOS Convention requires coastal states to give due 
publicity to the charts or lists of geographical co-ordinates related to their baseline or 
jurisdictions and to deposit a copy of each such charts or list with the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations.
29
 Considering that several unfortunate incidents that had happened 
before was mainly due to the uncertainty on such matters, this is essential to building a stable 
regional ocean regime. 
Second, the LOS Convention offers a pacific settlement system which would 
substantially contribute to the development of uniform practice and interpretation of the 
Convention.
30
 The LOS Convention also provides the basis for further development of law 
by providing general principles and framework for such issues as marine environment and 
marine scientific research. The regional state should make the best of the mechanism and 
framework provided in the LOS Convention to settle their future disputes and to promote 
cooperation among them. 
Third, the regional states make efforts to develop a more harmonious and solid maritime 
regime. In particular, regional states could negotiate agreed understandings regarding those 
controversial rules of the law of the sea which are inconsistent with the policies of certain 
states. For instance, the United States and the Soviet Union in 1989 signed a joint statement 
on innocent passage of warship in each other’s territorial seas. Attached to the joint statement, 
the two governments issued the uniform interpretation of the rules of international law 
governing innocent passage which sets forth in more detail the common interpretation of the 
Convention governing the innocent passage in the territorial sea.
31
 Similar measures could be 
taken among regional states with respect to various controversial issues. In addition, regional 
                                                          
28 Strong support for, and commitment to, the LOS Convention is evident in the East Asian region. The 
following states are now parties to the LOS Convention: Australia, China, Indonesia, India, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Marshall Islands, Philippines, Palau, Russia, Nauru, 
South Korea, Singapore, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. 
29 Articles 16, 75 and 84 of the LOS Convention. 
30 Part XV of the LOS Convention. 
31 For the text of the statement with the attached Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law 
governing Innocent Passage, see International Legal Materials, Vol. 28, No. 6, pp. 1444-1447. 




maritime councils or other coordinating bodies could be established for the purpose of 
coordination and strengthening cooperation among regional states. 
 
3.2. Implementation of Maritime Confidence-Building Measures 
 
Along with these efforts to build a stable regime, various maritime confidence and 
security building measures should be explored, taking into consideration the changing 
maritime security context. With the gradual changes to the maritime security environment, 
the importance of naval cooperation is growing. Naval cooperation has wide scope and may 
be bilateral or multilateral. At the lower level are low-key confidence-building measures 
such as ship visits, fleet reviews, personnel exchanges, navy-to-navy talks, and multilateral 
naval conferences. More ambitious activities might include information/intelligence 
exchanges, joint doctrine development, and combined exercise. The top end of naval 
cooperation might include cooperative maritime surveillance, standing regional naval forces, 
cooperative SLOC protection, and mine-countermeasures. One idea which deserves more 
attention is a regional agreement for the purpose of preventing incidents at sea. The need for 
such agreements has become real, due mainly to the greater naval presence of many states in 
the region’s waters. Moreover, agreement would subsequently facilitate development of 
more important issues in the future. While it will take some time for regional countries to 
develop more substantive forms of naval cooperation, naval cooperative activities are now 
much more common in the region than they were just a few years ago. 
Along with naval cooperation, coast guard cooperation is another important area for 
maritime confidence-building. In fact, coast guard cooperation has a great potential for 
success in East Asia, because the regional countries prefer to deploy coast guard ships and 
personnel in sensitive situations at sea rather than naval ships and personnel and to use coast 
guards for cooperative activities with other countries. Currently cooperation between 
regional coast guards is expanding rapidly at both bilateral and multilateral levels.
32
     
 
3.3. Separation of Territorial/Jurisdictional Issues from Resource Issues 
 
With respect to the territory/boundary and resources issues, the prospects for resolving 
territorial disputes are slim. Given the enormous difficulties related to resolving ongoing 
sovereignty disputes, it is better to divorce the question of sovereignty from the more 
technical boundary negotiations. Furthermore, in light of the complexities of the 
geographical and other situations in the region, a more function-oriented approach is 
preferable to a jurisdiction-oriented approach such as boundary delimitation. Regional states 
should be encouraged to resolve pressing issues of environmental protection and resource 
development without incorporating underlying sovereignty and boundary issues. For instance, 
the states may address fishery problems, which motivated them to establish the 200-mile 
zones, from a regional perspective by promoting a coordinated policy of conservation and 
effective enforcement procedures. They may also work out cooperative arrangements for the 
                                                          
32 The North Pacific coast guard summit was launched in 2000 as an initiative of Japan. Participating 
countries are Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States. The most recent 
summit was held in Kobe, Japan in September 2005, and discussions included steps to fight terrorism, 
smuggling and other crimes. 
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development of seabed natural resources.
33
 Since such arrangements could be established 
without prejudice to underlying territorial and maritime boundary issues, they might 
constitute optimal solutions that would defer more politically charged issues to the indefinite 
future. Given the rather sensitive political relations between various regional states, this 
approach may be more constructive. 
 
3.4. Regional Cooperation for Maintaining Law and Order at Sea 
 
Maintaining law and order at sea requires close cooperation among regional countries.  
There has been substantial progress in this regard in the region, especially since the 
September 11 terrorist attack. Currently, the four Southeast Asian countries that are adjacent 
to the Malacca Strait, namely Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand, have launched a 
joint security-initiative to provide cooperative air surveillance and situational awareness of 
what is happening in the Strait. This project, known as the “Eyes in the Sky”, involves 
routine patrols of designated areas of the Strait by maritime patrol aircraft from the 
participating countries (Ong and Ho 2005). While the major users of the Strait, the United 
States and Japan, still criticize the strait’s States for not doing enough to ensure the security 
of the shipping in the Strait, such initiative shows how far regional cooperation in 
maintaining law and order at sea has progressed.    
Despite such progress, however, there is not much enthusiasm in the region at this stage 
for proceeding with a full-blown regional maritime surveillance regime. Moreover, East 
Asian countries were neither enthusiastic about the initiative to interdict shipments of 
weapons of mass destruction flowing to and from state or non-state actors of “proliferation 
concern”.
34
 Short of a structured maritime surveillance or interdiction regime, arrangements 
for the exchange of maritime information and data would be very important as potential 
maritime confidence and security building measures in their own right and a prerequisite for 
to the forms of maritime security cooperation including maritime surveillance. Given the 
growing awareness of the serious risks of threats of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of 






Maritime security issues are by nature transnational, and thus coordinated and 
cooperative approach to them is essential for enhancing regional maritime security. While 
the benefits of close regional cooperation are clear, there are major barriers to effective 
maritime cooperation in East Asia. For one, the notion of sovereignty is still so firmly 
entrenched in the minds of regional countries that they are generally reluctant to agree to 
cooperative activities if such activities appear to compromise or qualify their national 
                                                          
33 Perhaps the best and the only way to resolve the current dispute between China and Japan over 
natural gas exploration and drilling in the East China Sea is joint development.   
34 Only two East Asian States, Japan and Singapore, are full members of the Proliferation Security 
Initiative. Other East Asian States that are key to the successful implementation of the initiative, 
notably China, South Korea, India, and Indonesia, have deferred active involvement despite pressure 
from the United States. 




sovereignty. In addition, the fact that regional countries are not equally capable of 
participating in cooperative process, another obstacle to regional cooperation. In such 
situation, “weaker states” may be reluctant to cooperate if they perceive that the cooperative 
processes would be dominated by “stronger states”. More generally, the prevailing sense of 
distrust and the lack of political framework in East Asia hinder regional countries to develop 
a more substantial form of cooperation at sea.      
While the main paradigm of maritime politics remains largely state-centric, regional 
states need to understand its limitation. Regional states should consider a more function-
oriented approach to the sovereignty or jurisdiction-oriented approach. They should also 
work out cooperative arrangements for various impending issues such as the development of 
ocean resources and protection of marine environment. Since such arrangements could be 
established without prejudice to the underlying territorial and jurisdictional issues, they 
might constitute optimal solutions that would defer the more politically charged issues to the 
indefinite future. While such approach may be put aside as naïve idealism, regional countries 
need to understand that there is no better place for idealism than ocean, and that East Asia is 
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